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Early Life and Education
Stephen G. Breyer has been an influential member on our nation's highest court
for over twenty years. During that time, Justice Breyer has gained a reputation as a
pragmatic, optimistic and cooperative Supreme Court Justice. Stephen Breyer was bom
August 15, 1938, in San Francisco, Califomi4 to Irving G. Breyer and Anne R. Breyer. I
Irving Breyer was legal counsel for the San Francisco Board of Education, while Anne
Breyer's work focused on public service. 2 Justice Breyer was exposed to both legal and
political activity at a young age due to his parents' careers. Justice Breyer's middle class
upbringing likely had a large impact on his pragmatic judicial approach.
Stephen and his siblings were raised in a middle-class Jewish household. Both
Breyer and his younger brother, Charles, a current federal district judge, were Eagle
Scouts.3 In 1955, Breyer graduated from Lowell High School, where he regularly
debated in toumaments.a Breyer graduated Stantbrd University in 1959, with a major in
Philosophy, and went on to Magdelen College at Oxford University as a Marshall
Scholar.s Breyer graduated Oxford in 1961 with First Class Honors.6 Shortly thereafter,
Breyer retumed to the United States to attend Harvard Law School, where he worked as
an editor at the Harvard Law Review. 7 Breyer graduated Harvard Law School magna
cum laude. 8
I https://www.law.comell.edu/supct/justices/breyer.bio.html
2 https://www.oyez.org/justices/stephen 
€ 
breyer
3 Townley, Alvin (2007) Legacy of Honor: The Values and inJluence ofAmerica's Eagle Scouts. New
York: St. Martin's Press. Pp56-69 ISBN 0-312-36653-1
a See Note 2
s See Note 2
6 See Note 2
7 See Note 2
8 See Note 2
2
In 1967, he married the Hon. Joaruta Freda Hare. a psychologist and member of
the British aristocracy. The Breyers have three adult children: Chloe, an Episcopal priest
and author of The Closel Nell, and Michael. e
Legal Career
Following gaduation from Harvard Law, Breyer clerked with Justice Arthur
Goldberg, an associate justice on the Supreme Court of the United States.r0 Following his
clerkship, Breyer served as a fact checker for the Warren Commission (an investigation
into the assassination of United States President John F. Kennedy that had taken place on
November 22, 1963). Breyer also served as a Special Assistant to the Assistant U.S.
Attomey General for Antitrust from 1 965 until 1967.' I
1l 1967, Breyer eamed a place as an associate professor at Harvard Law. 12
Breyer officially taught at Harvard Law until 1994 and has maintained a position among
the Harvard Law faculty in some capacity over the years. At Harvard, Breyer was known
as a leading expert on administrative law. 13 While there. he vnote two highly influential
books on deregulation: Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Elfective Risk
Regulation and Regulation and lts Reform. Breyer also wrote one of the most widely
cited skeptical examinations ofcopyright, The Uneasy Case for Copyright.
Breyer continued his legal ciueer as an Assistant Special Prosecutor of the
Watergate Special Prosecution Force in 1973.1415 Breyer then joined the U.S. Senate
e http://www.supremecout.gov/about/biographies.aspx
ro See note 2
lr See note 2
12 See note 2
13 The dilemmas ofrisk regulation 
- 
Breaking the Vicious Circle by Stephen Breyer, by Sheila Jasanoff
Issues in Science and Technology, Spring 1994.
14 
"A buglary tums into a Constitutional crisis" CNM June 16, 2004
3
Judiciary Committee, first as Special Counsel (1974 until 1975) and then as Chief
Counsel from 1979 until 1980. 16 His position as Chief Counsel bolstered his reputation
as a competent and capable legal mind among both Democrats and Republicans. He
worked closely with the chairman of the committee, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, to pass
the Airline Deregulation Act that closed the Civil Aeronautics Board. r7
Judicial Career
In the last days of President Jimmy Carter's administration, Carter nominated
Breyer to the First Circuit's U.S. Court of Appeals. The U.S. Senate confirmed him on
December 9, 1980, by an 80-10 vote. l8 Breyer maintained a position on the U.S. Cou(
of Appeals for the next fourteen years, acting as the court's Chief Judge from 1990 to
1994.1e During this time, Breyer made a name for himself as a judge who leaned neither
to the left nor the right but satisfied both sides of the aisle by remaining moderate.
He served as a member of the Judicial Conference of the United States between
1990 and 1994 and the United States Sentencing Commission between 1985 and 1989.20
On the sentencing commission, Breyer played a key role in reforming federal criminal
sentencing procedures, producing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which were
formulated to increase uniformity in sentencing.2l
15 A major political scandal that occurred in the United States in the 1970s as a result ofthe June 17, 1972
break-in at the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters at the Watergate oflice complex in
Washington, D.C., and President Richard Nixon's administration's attempted cover-up ofits involvement.
When the conspiracy was discovered and investigated by the U.S. Congress, the Nixon administration's
resistance to its probes led to a Constitutional crisis.
16 See note l0
r? Thierer, Adam (December 21,2010) Who'll Really Benefit ftom Net Neutrality Regularions? CBS News
18 
"Sharp Questions for Judge Breyer". ly's| York Times. July lO,2OO4.
le See note 10
20 See Note lo
2r 
"Justice Breyer Should Recuse Himself from Ruling on Constitutionality ofFederal Senlencing
Guidelines, Duke Law Professor Says" . Duke University News.
4
Breyer was hit by a car in 1993 while riding his bicycle, and the accident left him
with broken ribs and a punctured lung. That did not deter him from leaving the hospital,
however, to meet with President Clinton in Washinglon when Clinton was considering
nominating him to the Supreme Court. (He lost out to Ruth Bader Ginsburg the first time
around.) 22 23 Breyer's Supreme Court appointment came shortly after the retirement of
Harry Blackmun. President Clinton nominated Breyer as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court on May 13,1994 and Breyer took his seat August 3, 1994.24
Legal Philosophy
Justice Breyer is considered an integral part of the Court's liberal wing. He is well
known for his pragmatic analysis of cases.25 His decisions are often guided by analyzing
the real life consequences of the people aflected by the court's ruling. This principle can
abandon the strict interpretation some of his fellow justices favor, particularly the more
conservatives ones. Breyer opposes the originalism approach, which is most often
associated with Justice Scalia and demands a strict interpretation of the language of the
Constitution. 26 \n 2006, Breyer said that in assessing a law's Constitutionality, while
some of his colleagues "emphasize language. a more literal reading ofthe IConstitution's]
text, history and tradition". he looks more closely to the "purpose (fiamers intent) and
22 Berke, Richard (June 15, 1993). 'fne Overvlew: Clinto
lo Court". New York Times.
2r Associated Press, Justice Breyer breaks collarbone in bike accident, Boston.com (May 31, 201 l),
available at
http://www.boston.com,/news/locaVmassachusetts/articles/201 I /05/31/justice breyer_breaks collarbone_in
_bike-accidenV.
2a See Note l0
25 See Note 2
26 See Note 2
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consequences".2T In many areas of the Court, Breyer's pragmatism is considered the
intellectual counterweight to Scalia's textualist philosophy.28
Breyer is recognized to be deferential to the interests of law enforcement and to
legislative judgnents in the Supreme Court's First Amendment rulings. Breyer is known
for respecting decisions made by the legislature, voting to overtum congressional
legislation at a lower rate than any other Supreme Court justice since 1994.2e Breyer has
consistently voted in favor of abortion rights.3o Breyer rejects Justice Scalia's strict Sixth
Amendment interpretation that all facts necessary to criminal punishment must be
submitted to ajury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.3l
Breyer has noted use of six interpretive tools in describing his interpretive
philosophy: text, history, tradition, precedent, the purpose of a statute, and the
consequences of competing interpretations. 32 Breyer believes only the last two
difl-erentiate him from textualists on the Supreme Court (such as Scalia). Breyer argues,
"these sources are necessary, however, and in the former case (purpose), can in fact
provide greater objectivity in legal interpretation than looking merely at what is often
ambiguous statutory text." 33 Breyer argues that considering the impact of legal
interpretations (consequences) is a further way of ensuring consistency with a law's
intended purpose. 3a Breyer expanded on his judicial philosophy in Active Liberty:
Interpreting our Democrotic Constitution.
17 
"Justice Breyer Favors 'Less Literal' Readings". newsmax.com. February 9,2006
:E Sullivan, Kathleen M. (February 5, 2006). "Consent ofthe Govemed". New York Times
re cewirtz, Paul; Golder, Chad (July 6, 2005). "So Who Arc the Activists?". New York Times.
30 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)
3r Blakely y. Washington, 542 U.5.296 (2004)
32 Lithwick, Dalia (December 6, 2006). "Justice Grover Versus Justice Oscar". Slate
3r 
"lnterview with Nina Totenberg". 1r'PR. Septemb€r 30, 2005.
34 Sunstein, Cass R. (May 2006). "Justice Breyer's Democratic Pragmatism". The Yale Law Journal
6
Active Liberty
Active Liberty is considered a response to the 1997 book I Matter of
Interpretation, in which Antonin Scalia emphasized adherence to the original meaning of
the text alone. 35 In it, Breyer urges judges to interpret legal provisions (of the
Constitution or of statutes) in light of the purpose of the text and how well the
consequences of specific rulings will fit those purposes.
ln Active Liberty, Breyer references Isaiah Berlin's Two Concepts of Liberty.36
The first concept is "freedom from government coercion (negative liberty)". The second
Berlinian concept is "freedom to participate in the government (positive liberty)." Active
Liberty established the importance of positive liberty over the competing idea of negative
liberty. Breyer makes a utilitarian argrunent for judges who are making rulings that can
affect the democratic intention of the Constitution. Breyer states, "the framers of the
Constitution sought to establish a democratic govemment involving the maximum liberty
for its citizens."
MAJORITY OPINIONS
Gray v. Mayland3T
Breyer was assigned the opinion in Gray v. Maryland, a 5-4 decision dealing with
the application of Bruton v. United States.38 Bruton involved two defendants accused of
participating in the same crime and tried jointly before the same jury. One of the
defendants had confessed. His confession named and incriminated the other defendant.
35 Feeney, Mark (October 3, 2005). "Author in the Court: Justice Stephen Breyer's New Book Reflects His
Practical Approach to the Law". Boston Globe.
16 Breyer, Stephen G. Active Liberty: Interpreting a Democratic Constitution. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008. Print.
37523 u.s. 185, I l8 s.ct. I l5l, 140 L.8d.2d294 (1998)
38391 u.s. 123, 88 s.ct. 1620, 20L.Ed.2d 476 (196s).
7
The trial judge issued a limiting instruction, telling the jury that it should consider the
confession as evidence only against ths codefendant who had confessed and not against
the defendant named in the confession.3e In Bruton the Court held, despite the limiting
instruction, the introduction of the out-of-court confession at Bruton's trial had violated
his right, protected by the Sixth Amendment, to cross-examine witnesses. a0
Grav v. Ma{yland differs from Bruton in that the prosecution here redacted the
codefendant's confession by substituting, for the defendant's name in the confession, a
blank space or the word "deleted." The Supreme Court decided whether these
substitutions make a significant legal difference. In an opinion considered by Justice
Breyer, the Supreme Court held that Bruton's protective rule applies.al In deciding
whether Bruton's protective rule applied to the redacted confession, Breyer considered
both Bruton and a later case, fuchardson v. Marsh, which limited Bruton's scope.a2
In Bruton, the Court recognized that in many circumstances a limiting instruction
would adequately protect one defendant from the prejudicial effects of the introduction at
ajoint trial of evidence intended for use only against a different defendant.a3 But it said:
"There are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or
cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of lailure so
vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury
system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the
powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who
stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread
before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are the incriminations devastating
to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect.... The
unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged
3e ld.
40 39r US. 137,88S.Cr. t628,20 L.Ed.zd 476 (t968).
41 523 UL l85, 188, I t8 S.Ct. I l5t, I153, 140 L. Ed.2d 294 (1998)
4' 481 ILL 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987)
43 Id., at 135, 88 S.llt., at 1627-1628
B
accomplice, as here, does not testifr and cannot be tested by cross-
examination." a
The Court found that the confession in Bruton constituted such a "powerfully
incriminating extrajudicial statement," that its introduction into evidence, insulated from
cross-examination, violated Bruton's Sixth Amendment rights. 45
In Richardson v. Marsh, the Court considered a redacted confession. The case
involved a joint murder trial of Marsh and Williams. The State had redacted the
confession of one defendant, Williams, so as to "omit all reference" to his codefendant,
Marsh-"indeed, to omit all indication that anyone other than ... Williams" and a third
person had "participated in the crime." a6 The Court held that this redacted confession fell
outside Bruton's scope and was admissible (with appropriate limiting instructions) at the
joint trial. The Court distinguished the confession in Bruton as a confession that was
"incriminating on its face," and which had "expressly implicated" Bruton. a7
In typical Justice Breyer fashion, his opinion analyzed the consequences of
Bruton's protective rule. He specifically discussed the consequences ofjury members
inferring a connection between the redacted confession and the defendant. Justice Breyer
believes an inference pure and simple cannot make the critical difference. a8 Justice
Breyer differentiated the "kinds of inferences" a reasonable jury could make. For
example, fuchardson's inferences involved statements that did not refer directly to the
a Id., at 135-136,88 S.Ct., at 1628
o'I4
46 481 U.S. 203, 107 S.Ct. 1705, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987)
a7 481 !LS- at 208, 107 S.Ct., at 1707.
4E 523 US. 185, 195, ll8s.ct. ll5l, 1t56, t4oL.Ed.2d294 (199t)
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defendant himself and which became incriminating "only when linked with evidence
introduced later at trial."ae
Justice Breyer further discussed whether the inclusion of confessions, that
incriminated "by connection", could too often provoke mistrials, or would unnecessarily
lead prosecutors to abandon the confession or joint trial, because neither the prosecutors
nor the judge could easily predict, until after the introduction of all the evidence, whether
or not Bruton had barred use ofthe confession.so Justice Breyer believes blanks, the word
"delete," symbols, or other indications of redaction, within Bruton's protections, run no
such risk, as their use is easily identified prior to trial and does not depend, in any special
way, upon the other evidence introduced in the case.5l
Justice Breyer demonstrated his pragmatic approach by interpreting the statute
broadly. As opposed to the strict textualist approach, Justice Breyer constructs his
opinion based on the consequential effects ofthe Supreme Court's holding.
Stenberg v. Carharts2
Stenbere v. Carhart, deals with a Nebraska law that made performing "partial-
birth abortion" strictly illegal, ignoring possible health issues of t}re mother.53 Nebraska
physicians who performed the procedure contrary to the law were subject to having their
medical licenses revoked. The Court struck down the law, finding the Nebraska statute
criminalizing "partial birth abortions" violated the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution.
4e 523 Uf 185, 196, I l8 s.ct. I l5l, I157, 140 L. Ed.2d 294 (1998)
50 481 lll, at 209, 107 S.Ct., at 1708.
5' 523 US 185, 197, 118 s.ct. I l5l, 1157, 140 L. Ed.2d 294 (1998)
52 530 U.S. 914 (2000)
53 530 US-914, 120 S.Ct.2597, 14'1L.8d.2d743 (2000)
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Justice Breyer, in writing the opinion of the Court, cited Planned Parenthood v.
Casey and said that any abortion law that imposed an undue burden on a woman's "right
to choose" (abortion) was unconstitutional. sa He said that causing those who procure
abortions to "fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment" was an undue burden, and
therefore declared the law to be against the Constitution. s5
Justice Breyer relied on three established principles to formulate his opinion.
First, before "viability ... the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy."
Second, "a law designed to further the State's interest in fetal life which imposes an
undue burden on the woman's decision before fetal viability" is unconstitutional. Third, "
'subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary,
in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother."56
Justice Breyer concluded that the Nebraska's statute violated the Federal
Constitution for two independent reasons. First, the law lacks any exception "for the
preservation of the ... health of the mother." Second, it "imposes an undue burden on a
woman's ability" to choose a partial birth abortion, thereby unduly burdening the right to
choose abortion itself. 57
Had Nebraska's statute included an exception for the life and health ofthe mother,
Breyer states, the issue presented would be quite different. Justice Breyer believes an
abortion regulation constitutes an undue burden if it "has the purpose or effect ofplacing
54 505 u.s.833, ttz s.ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.zd 614.
" l-d.56 530 u.s. 914, 918, t20 s.ct.2597,2603, t47 L. Ed.2di43 (2000)
57 530 US. 914, 929-30, 120 S.Ct. 2597,2608-09, 14',7 L. Ed.2d'143 (2000)
11
(
a substantial obstacle in the path ofa woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." 58
If there were adequate altemative methods for a woman safely to obtain an abortion
before viability, it is unlikely that prohibiting the procedure alone would "amount in
practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion."sg
Justice Breyer's opinion in Stenbere exemplifies his pragmatic judicial approach.
His analysis is concemed with the consequences that Nebraska's law could have on
United States citizens. He provides circumstances where women would be unduly
burdened by such a law and even goes on to discuss the burdens doctors would face.
NLRB v. Noel Canning6o
National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Cannins, was a United States Supreme
Court case in which the Court unanimously ruled that the President of the United States
can only use his aulhority under the Recess Appointment Clause of the United States
Constitution when the United States Senate is in recess and not able to transact Senate
business. The Court held that the clause allows the president to make appointments
during both intra-session and inter-session recesses, but only if the recess is of sufficient
length, and if the Senate is actually unavailable for deliberation. 6r
Justice Breyer tackled three issues in his written opinion. The first issue addressed
the scope of the phrase "the recess ofthe Senate" and whether that is limited to the inter-
session recess between the two formal annual sessions ofa Congress, or extends to intra-
session recesses. Given the ambiguity of the specific text of the clause, the Court held
that the clause's purpose is broad, allowing the President to ensure the continued
5E 530 U.S. 914, 950-51, 120 S.Ct. 2597 ,2619-20, 147 L. Ed.2d 743 (2000)
" ]d.60 134 S.Ct.2550, 189 L. Ed.2d 538 (2014)
6' 134 S.Ct.2550,2578, 189 L. Ed.2d 538 (2014)
12
(
functioning of govemment even when the Senate is away.62 To strengthen this anti-
textualist approach, Breyer offered strong historical support for the broad interpretation.63
The second issue addressed the phrase "vacancies that may happen during the
recess of the Senate." Justice Breyer believed that the clause's language, read literally,
permits, though it does not naturally favor, his broader interpretation.a Thomas Jefferson
admitted that the clause is subject to two constructions, and the Court argued that a
narrow interpretation risks undermining powers granted by the Constitution. The opinion
found that the phrase applies to both vacancies that occur during a recess, and those that
occur before and continue to exist through a recess. 65
Finally, the opinion dealt with the calculation of the length of the Senate's recess.
The Solicitor General argued that the Senate was not actually in session when meeting
were held in pro forma sessions. Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, stated, "We hold
that, for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, the Senate is in session when it
says it is, provided that, under its own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate
business."66 The Supreme Court held that pro forma sessions count as sessions, not
recesses, consistent with the Constitution's delegation of authority to the Senate to
determine how it conducts its own business.
Justice Breyer's opinion demonstrated that he is not confined by the strict
interpretation of a statute's text. Justice Breyer applied a broad interpretation when
analyzing the Recess Appointment Clause. Justice Breyer provided historical support to
62 134 S.Ct.2550,2561, 189 L. Ed.2d 538 (2014)
63 134 s.ct. 2550,2561, 189 L. Ed.2d 538 (2014)
61 134 S.Ct. 2550,2567, 189 L. Ed.2d 538 (2014)
u'.[.d.
66 t34 S.Ct.2550,2555, 189 L. Ed.2d 53S (2014)
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show that, even in the times of our founding fathers, laws can be made with a broad
purpos9.
CONCURRING OPINIONS
J. Mclntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro6T
J. Mclntyre Machinerv v. Nicastro was a decision by the United States Supreme
Court which ruled that a court may not exercise jurisdiction over a defendant that has not
purposefully availed itself of doing business in the jurisdiction or placed goods in the
stream of commerce in the expectation they would be purchased in the jurisdiction.
An accident cut four fingers off the right hand of Robert Nicastro. Mr. Nicastro
was operating a recycling machine used to cut scrap metal.68 A British company
manufactured the machine and sold it through its exclusive U.S. distributor. Nicastro
sued J. Mclntyre Machinery, Ltd., the British company, and its U.S. distributor, Mclntyre
Machinery America, Ltd., in the Bergen County vicinage of the Law Division of the
Superior Court of New Jersey, under a strict product liability theory.6e The British parent
company moved to dismiss the suit against it for lack of personal jurisdiction.
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have
jurisdiction. T0 According to Justice Keruredy's plumlity opinion, the facts may reveal
intent to serve the U.S. market, but they do not show that J. Mclntlre purposefully
availed itself of the New Jersey market. Tl According to Kennedy, respondent did not
establish that J. Mclntyre engaged in conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey.
67 131 s.cr. 2780
68 l3l s.ct. 2780, 2782, t8O L.Ed.2d765 (201l)
u'Ld.
70 l3l sel 2780, 2791, t80 L. Ed.2d 765 (201l)
7' 131 S.Q!. 2780, 2790, 180 L. Ed.2d'765 (201l)
t4
Although the company targeted the United States as a whole, only its distributor targeted
the specific states. The stream of cornnerce theory is insufficient to give rise to
jurisdiction without specific targeting of a specific state.72
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment on narrower grounds.T3 In Breyer's
view, the outcome of this case was determined by the Supreme Court's precedent cases.
Rather than announce a broad rule, Breyer determined that based on the facts of this
specific case New Jersey did not have jurisdiction because so few machines wound up in
the state. 7a
According to Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted a broad
understanding of the scope of personal jurisdiction based on its view that "the
increasingly fasfpaced globalization of the world economy has removed national borders
as barriers to trade." He acknowledges the recent changes in commerce and
communication that could not have been anticipated by the Supreme Court's precedents.
However, Justice Breyer does not see any of those issues in this case. Justice Breyer
stated, "l think it unwise to announce a rule of broad applicability without full
consideration of the modem-day consequences."T5
According to Justice Breyer, respondent Robert Nicastro failed to meet his burden
to demonstrate that it was Constitutionally proper to exercise jurisdiction over petitioner
J. Mclntyre Machinery, Ltd. (British Manufacturer), a British firm that manufactures
1' t3t s.ct.2780,2784, 180 L. Ed. 2d 765 (201l)
?3 l3l S!! 2780, 2i9t, tB}L.Ed.2d765 (2011)
'o Ld.
75 l3l s.ct.2780,2791, 180 L. Ed.2d 765 (20 )
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scrap-metal machines in Great Britain and sells them through an independent distributor
in the United States (American Distributor).?6
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in J. Mclntyre perfectly summarizes his
pragmatic neutral approach. Justice Breyer's statement,'1 think it unwise to announce a
rule of broad applicability without full consideration of the modem-day consequences,"
exemplifies the way he rules on cases. Justice Breyer is aware that with changing times
comes changing technology and communication. With these changes, it is necessary for
laws and statutes to change with them. This opinion also shows Justice Breyer's neutral
opinion. Whereas most judges (for example Scalia) consistently vote either
conservatively or liberally, Justice Breyer is willing to analyze each case with an
unbiased mind. This is evident by the fact that he believes there should be a rule of
nanow applicability.
DISSENTING OPINIONS
Glossip v. GrossTT
Glossip v. Gross is a 2015 United States Supreme Court case that ruled executions
carried out by a three-drug protocol of midazolam, pancuronium bromide, and potassium
chloride did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.TE The petitioners argued that the midazolam, intended to
be used as sedative, would not render them unable to feel the pain of the other two
drugs.Te
" Id.n t35 s.ct.27z6
7E B5 s.ct.2726,27 46, t92 L. Ed. 2d 761 (2015)
7e 135 s.cl.2726,2729,192 L. Ed. zd76l (2015)
16
Justice Breyer did not address the primary issue of the case, but discussed a
broader issue dealing with Constitutional interpretation. In a written dissent, Breyer
argued that the Constitutionality of a punishment must be evaluated based on current
social and legal standards. Justice Breyer pointed to fundamental Constitutional defects
of the death penalty: (1) serious unreliability, (2) arbitrariness in application, (3)
unconscionably long delays that undermine the death penalty's penological purpose, and
(4) most places within the United States have abandoned its use.80
Justice Breyer attached studies that show that the exoneration rate is
disproportionately high with capital crimes, which reflects both cases in which the
defendant was acfually innocent and cases in which there was procedural error.
Therefore, the death penalty is not reliably applied to cases in which the defendant has
been properly convicted of crimes that society harshly condemns.El Researchers estimate
that about 4% ofthose sentenced to death are actually innocent.82
Additionally, Justice Breyer points to studies showing that factors other than the
egregiousness of the crime-such as the race and gender of the defendant and the victim,
the location of the crime, and political pressures-influence the imposition of the death
penalty, and such arbitrariness results in the punishment being unconstitutionally cruel.83
Numerous studies, for example, have concluded that individuals accused of murdering
white victims, as opposed to black or other minority victims, are more likely to receive
Etl35 S.Ct.2726,2758, t92 L. Ed.2d'761 (2015)
82 Gross, O'Brien, Hu, & Kennedy, Rate ofFalse Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced
to Death, 111 Proceeding ofthe National Academy ofSciences 7230 (2014)
83l35 S-L2726,2760, 192L. Ed.2d76t (2015)
t7
the death penalty.Ea Justice Breyer also discussed the excessive long periods of time that
individuals tlpically spend on death row before being executed.85
Justice Breyer argued that the nation has consistently been moving away from the
use ofthe death penalty, to the point that it is used so rarely that it should be considered
"cruel and unusual' for the purpose of the Eighth Amendment. In the last two decades,
the imposition and implementation of the death penalty have increasingly become
unusual and last year, in 2014, only seven States carried out an execution.86
District of Columbia v. HellefT
District of Columbia v. Heller, was a case in which the Supreme Court of the
United States held in a 5-4 decision that the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects an individual's right to possess a firearm for traditionally la*firl
purposes, such as self-defense within the home.
Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, which sought to demonstrate that,
starting from the premise of an individual-rights view, the District of Columbia's handgun
ban and trigger lock requirement would nevertheless be permissible limitations on the
right.88 According to Justice Breyer, the majority's conclusion is wrong for two
independent reasons. The first reason is that the Second Amendment protects militia-
related, not self-defense-related, interesls.8e Justice Breyer believes these two interests are
sometimes intertwined. To assure l8th-century citizens that they could keep arms for
militia purposes would necessarily have allowed them to keep arms that they could have
& GAO, Report to the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary: Death Penalty Sentencing
E5B5 S.Ct.2726,27U, 192 L. Ed. 2d 761 (2015)
E6 B5 S.Ct.2726,2772, 192 L.Ed.2d76l (2015)
87 128 s.cr.2783 (20t4)
88 554 u.s. 570, 681 , t2g s.ct.2i83,2847, tit L.Ed.2d 637 (2009\t'Ld.
lo
used for self-defense as well. But self-defense alone, detached from any militia-related
obiective, is not the Amendment's concem.eo
Breyer's second independent reason is that the protection the Amendment
provides is not absolute. el According to Justice Breyer, the Amendment permits
govemment to regulate the interests that it serves. Thus, irrespective of what those
interests are-whether they do or do not include an independent interest in self-defense-
the majority's view cannot be correct unless it can show that the District's regulation is
unreasonable or inappropriate in Second Amendment terms.
Justice Breyer believes the purpose of those who wrote the Second Amendment
was to help assure citizens that they would have arms available for purposes of self-
defense.e2 Justice Breyer points out that a legislature could reasonably conclude that the
law will advance goals of great public importance, namely, saving lives, preventing
injury, and reducing crime. However he believes the law is tailored to the urban crime
problem, in that it is local in scope and thus affects only a geographic area both limited in
size and entirely urban; the law concems handguns, which are specially linked to urban
gun deaths and injuries, and which are the overwhelmingly favorite weapon of armed
criminals; and at the same time, the law imposes a burden upon gun owners that seems
proportionately no greater than restrictions in existence at the time the Second
Amendment was adopted.e3 Based on these circumstances, Justice Breyer believes the
District's law falls within the zone that the Second Amendment leaves open to regulation
by legislatures.
e0 
!-d.
" Ld.
,,554 US 570, 682, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 284748,l'tl L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008)
e3 ld.
1.9
Justice Breyer's dissent looks to early municipal fire-safety laws that forbade the
storage of gunpowder, and on nuisance laws providing fines or loss of firearm for
imprudent usage, as demonstrating the Second Amendment has been understood to have
no impact on the regulation ofcivilian firearms.ea Justice Breyer argues the public safety
necessity of gun-control laws, quoting that "guns were responsible for 69 deaths in this
country each day."e5
With these two supports, the Breyer dissent goes on to conclude, "there simply is
no untouchable Constitutional right guaranteed by the Second Amendment to keep
loaded handguns in the house in crime-ridden urban areas."e6 He proposes that firearms
laws be reviewed by an interest-balancing approach of Second Amendment protections
against the govemment's compelling interest of preventing crime.
Justice Breyer believes adoption of a true stricrscrutiny standard for evaluating
gun regulations would be impossible because almost every gun-control regulation will
seek to advance (as the one here does) a "primary concem of every govemment-a
concem for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens."eT The Court has deemed that
interest, as well as "the Govemment's general interest in preventing crime," to be
"compelling," and the Court has in a wide variety of Constitutional contexts found such
public-safety concems sufficiently forceful to justifu restrictions on individual liberties.e8
Thus, any attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in practice tum
into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second Amendment
e4 554 u.s. 570, 684 , t2g s.ct.2783,2949, t7 | L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008)
,5 554 11S.570, 694, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2854, t7t L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008)
,6 554 Us. 570, 722,128 S.Ct.2'783,2870, t7l L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008)
e7 United States v. Salemo,48l U.S. 739,755, lO7 S.Ct.2095,95 L.Ed.2d 697 (tg8't\.
e6 Brandenburg v. Ohio,395LJ.5.444,447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.zd 430 (1969)
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on one side and the govemmental public-safety concems on the other, the only question
being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course of
advancing the latter. Justice Breyer would simply adopt such an interest-balancing
inquiry explicitly.ee
Again, this opinion personifies Justice Breyer's pragmatic approach. He analyzed
the laws purpose through historical support and was concemed about the consequences of
such a law. Justice Breyer used all six interpretive tools in writing his dissent.
Interestingly, Justice Breyer used a very lextualist approach as to the Second Amendment
protecting only militia-related, not self-defense-related, interests. Typically the more
conservative Justices interpret statutes with this strict textual approach.
McCutcheon v. FECrm
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission was a campaign finance case before
the United States Supreme Court challenging Section 441 of the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA), which imposed a biennial aggregate limit on individual
contributions to national party and federal candidate committees.r0r The Supreme Court
held that the statutory aggregate limits on how much money a donor may contribute in
total to all political candidates or committees violated the First Amendment.l02 Chief
Justice John Roberts wrote in {rfl}inion that "The govemment may no more
restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspaper
how many candidates it may endorse."lo3
ep-e-LHcler, 554 U.S. 570, 689, 128 S.Ct.2783,2851-52, t7 | L. Ed.2d 637 (2008)
roo 134 SeL 1434
r0r 134 SlL 1434, 188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014)
ro2 Jd.
'03 134 S-e! A34,1438,188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014)
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According to Justice Breyer, the majority's legal analysis is faulty as it
misconstrues the nature ofthe competing Constitutional interests at stake. Justice Breyer
argues their opinion eviscerates our Nation's campaign finance laws, "leaving a remnant
incapable of dealing with the grave problems of democratic legitimacy that those laws
were intended to resolve."lM
Breyer point out that the decision "creates a loophole that will allow a single
individual to contribute millions of dollars to a political party or to a candidate's
campaign.l0s In the absence of limits on aggregate political contributions, donors can and
likely will find ways to channel millions ofdollars to parties and to individual candidates,
producing precisely the kind of "comrption" or "appearance of comrption" that
previously led the Court to hold aggregate limits Constitutional. 106 Justice Breyer
believes those opportunities for circumvention will also produce the type of comrption
that concerned the plurality. Justice Breyer states, '1he methods for using today's opinion
to evade the law's individual contribution limits are complex, but they are well known, or
will become well known, to party fundraisers."ro7
Justice Breyer is not blind to the fact that this ruling creates a loophole that will
allow a single individual to contribute millions of dollars to a political party or to a
candidate's campaign. Justice Breyer bases his dissent off the financial and social
consequences (such as the creation of loopholes) such a ruling would inevitably have on
our society. Justice Breyer is looking towards the future and is aware of the rippling
effects ofthe Supreme Court's holding.
'*ldI05134 Se!, u34, t465,188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014)
16134 S-e! U34, 1472, 188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014)
ro7ld.
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Arizona v. GantloE
Arizona v. Gant was a United States Supreme Court decision holding that the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires law enforcement officers to
demonstrate an actual and continuing threat to their safety posed by an arrestee, or a need
to preserve evidence related to the crime of arrest from tampering by the arrestee, in order
to justi$ a warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the vehicle's
recent occupants have been arrested and secured.l@ The Supreme Court held that police
may search the vehicle, of its recent occupant after his anest, only if it is reasonable to
believe that the arestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the anest. ll0 The Court reasoned that
"warrantless searches are per se unreasonable" and subject only to a few, very narrow
exceptions.l I I
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, where he lamented that the court could
not create a new goveming rule. Justice Breyer believes Beltonl12 is best read as setting
forth a bright-line rule that permits a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of
an automobile incident to the lawful arrest of an occupant-regardless of the danger the
arrested individual in fact poses.
ro€ 129 S{!. l Tto
r@ 556 u.s.332,361, 129 s.ct. t7 to, t73o,l 23 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009)
rro ld.
frr Relying on Katz v. United States,389 U.S.347,357,88 S.Cr.507, lg L.Ed,.2d 576.
r12 New York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454, l0l S.Cr. 2360, 69 L.Ed.2d 768-which held that police may search
the passenger compartment ofa vehicle and any containers therein as a contemporaneous incident ofa
recent occupanl's lawful arrest on the ground that it concerned the scope of a search incident to arrest but
did not answer the question whether officers may conduct such a search once the scene has been secured.
Justice Breyer argues that the Belton rule has been followed, not only by the
Supreme Court in Thornton v. United Statesll3, but also by numerous other courts.
Therefore he believes principles of stare decisis must apply, and those who wish this
Court to change a well-established legal precedent (where, as here, there has been
considerable reliance on the legal rule in question) bear a heavy burden.lla Accordingly,
Justice Breyer did not find that burden to have been met. Nor did he believe that the other
considerations ordinarily relevant when determining whether to ovemrle a case are
satisfied. ll5
Justice Breyer's dissent exemplifies why he is considered in the middle of the
conservative- liberal paradigm. It is uncommon for Breyer to argue against creating a
new goveming rule, especially a rule that would give citizens additional rights. However,
when analyzing Breyer's motives, it is clear that Justice Breyer is making his opinion
based offofthe legislative effects such a ruling could have. Breyer understands that there
are times and circumstances for making drastic changes to laws, but he does not believe
this is one of those circumstances. If the Supreme Court rules against a precedent
holding, a landfall oflegal issues could occur.
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlingtonll6
r13 Thornton v. United States,54l U.S. 615, 124 S.Ct.2t27,158 L.Ed.2d 905 (2004)
rra Relying on Cf. L€egin Creative Leather Products- Inc. y. PSKS. Inc., 551 U.S. B7j , 
-, 
lZ7 S.Ct.
2705,2719Jr, 168 L.Ed.2d 623 (200't)
| 
'5556 U.S. 332, 354-55, 129 S.Ct. t710, 1725-26,173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009)
r16 132 s.ct. l5lo
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Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlinglon was a United
States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that officials may strip-search
individuals who have been arrested for any crime before admitting the individuals to jail,
even ifthere is no reason to suspect that the individual is carrying contraband.lrT
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the lower court,
holding that the strip searches for inmates entering the general population of a prison do
not violate the Fourth Amendment.rrs The Court concluded that a prisoner's likelihood of
possessing contraband based on the severity of the current offense or an arrestee's
criminal history is too difficult to determine effectively. The Court pointed out instances,
such as the arrest of Timothy McVeigh, in which an individual who commits a minor
traffic offense is capable of extreme violence.lle The majority argued that strip searches
are needed (1) to detect injuries or diseases, such as lice, that might spread in
confinement, (2) to identify gang tattoos, which might reflect a need for special housing
to avoid violence, and (3) to detect contraband, including drugs, guns, knives, and even
pens or chewing gum, which might prove harmful or dangerous in prison. 120
Justice Breyer dissented, expressing that strip searches of individuals arrested for
minor offenses that do not involve drugs or violence are unreasonable unless the prison
official has a reasonable suspicion that that individual possesses drugs or contraband.
Justice Breyer understands that managing a jail or prison is an "inordinately difficult
undertaking," and that prison regulations that interfere with important constitutional
interests are generally valid as long as they are "reasonably related to legitimate
r17 132 S-eL l5lo, t5l l, 182 L. Ed.2d 566 (2012)
l18 Id.
rre 132 S-e! l5lo, 1520, tB2 L. Ed.2d 566 (2012)
'20 132 S-eL 1510, 1528, 182 L.F,d.2d,566 (2012)
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penological interests."r2lAdditionally, Breyer believes finding injuries and preventing
the spread of disease, minimizing the threat of gang violence, and detecting contraband
are "legitimate penological interests and that we normally defer to the expertise ofjail
and prison administrators in such matters. I22 Nonetheless, Breyer point out that the
"particular" invasion of interests must be "reasonably related" to the justifring
"penological interest" and the need must not be "exaggerated.-123. It is at this point that
Breyer parts company with the majority.
Breyer opined that there is no convincing reason, in the absence of reasonable
suspicion, that involuntary strip searches of those arrested for minor offenses are
necessary in order to further the penal interests mentioned. 124 Breyer points to empirical
evidence on strip-searches suggesting there is no convincing reason that, in the absence
of reasonable suspicion, involuntary strip-searches of those arrested lor minor offenses
are necessary. Breyer cited a study conducted in New York under the supervision of
federal courts, where out of 23,000 people searched, only one inmate had hidden
contraband in his body in a way that would have avoided detection by x-ray and a pat-
down.r25 Additionally, a cited Califomia study found only three instances out of 75,000
inmates strip-searched in a five-year period.126
Similar to Glossip, Justice Breyer uses studies to bolster his argument. Justice
Breyer looks at the marginal success rates of these strip searches, and when considering
'2'Id.
t22 ld.
'23 441 US., at 559,99 S.Ct. l86l
'24 132 S-eL l5lo, 1528, tB2L.Ed.2d 566 (2012\
r25 132 S-eL 1510, 1528, tB2L.Ed.2d 566 (20t2)
126 132 S-e!. l5lo, 1529, tB2L. Ed. zd 566 (20t2)
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the prisoner's loss of liberty, Breyer does not believe the pros outweigh the cons in
allowing these searches.
United States v. Bookerl2T
United States v. Booker is a United States Supreme Court decision conceming
criminal sentencing. The Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial requires
that, other than a prior conviction, only facts admitted by a defendant or proved beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury may be used to calculate a sentence exceeding the prescribed
statutory maximum sentence, whether the defendant has pleaded guilty or been convicted
at trial.128 The maximum sentence ajudge may impose is a sentence based upon the facts
admitted by the defendant or proved to ajury beyond a reasonable doubt.r2e
In a split but majority ruling, the Court struck down the provision of the federal
sentencing statute that required federal district judges to impose a sentence within the
Federal Guidelines range, along with the provision that deprived federal appeals courts of
the power to review sentences imposed outside the Guidelines range. 130 The Court
instructed federal district judges to impose a sentence with reference to a wider range of
sentencing factors set forth in the federal sentencing statute, and directed federal appeals
courts to review criminal sentences for "reasonableness." which the Court left
undefined.l3I
121 543 A-s-22o
t2E 543 U5220,221,125 S.Cr.738,741, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005)
r2e Id.
r30 ld.
t,t 543 A5220,224, 125 s. ct. i38,744, t6o L. Ed.2d 62t (2005)
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Justice Breyer argued on historical grounds that the Guidelines scheme is
Constitutional across the board.l32 Justice Breyer reiterated his disagreement with the
Aporendi rulel33, and then identified specific reasons not to apply the Blakelv holding to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Most importantly he believes the facts used to
determine a defendant's sentence has historically been solely within a judge's discretion,
and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be treated no differently.r3a Breyer believes
creating a system that frustrates the goal of increased sentencing uniformity hardly seems
fair to defendants or to the public at large. Breyer states to the extent that the Guidelines
did not adequately take into account an aggravating or mitigating circumstance, a judge
was free to depart from the Guidelines range. 135
As stated above, Breyer played a key role in reforming federal criminal
sentencing procedures, producing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which were
formulated to increase uniformity in sentencing. It is no surprise that, when considering
Justice Breyer's employment history, that he supported the Federal Sentencing Guideline.
Justice Breyer believes sentencing uniformity is the fairest system lor defendants.
Conclusion
Justice Breyer continues to be an influential and key member of our Supreme
Court over the past two decades. Justice Breyer's pragmatic approach balances the
132 543 a;220,235, 125 S. Ct.738,751, 160 L. Ed.2d 621 (2005)
1r3 In Aoorendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the defendant
pleaded guilfy to second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, which carried a prison
term of 5-to-10 years. Thereafter, the trial court found that his conduct had violated New Jersey's "hate
crime" law because it was mcially motivated, and imposed a l2-year sentence. The Supreme Court set
aside the enhanced sentence holding: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitt€d to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."
t34 543 AA220,233, 125 S. Cr.738,750, 160 L. F,d.2d621 (2005)
t15 5$ A5220,234, 125 S. Ct. 738,750, 160 L. Ed.2d 621 (2005)
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purpose ofa statute with the consequences of competing interpretations. It is refreshing to
see a Justice who bases their judicial opinion on societal consequences and does not
apply a strict interpretation to our Constitution. Justice Breyer is aware that laws must
adapt and change based offof the shifting views ofour society.
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